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Abstract 
 
An increasing number of cybersecurity incidents 
prompts organizations to explore alternative security 
solutions, such as threat intelligence programs. For 
such programs to succeed, data needs to be collected, 
validated, and recorded in relevant datastores. One 
potential source supplying these datastores is an 
organization’s security incident response team. 
However, researchers have argued that these teams 
focus more on eradication and recovery and less on 
providing feedback to enhance organizational security.  
This prompts the idea that data collected during security 
incident investigations may be of insufficient quality for 
threat intelligence analysis.  
While previous discussions focus on data quality 
issues from threat intelligence sharing perspectives, 
minimal research examines the data generated during 
incident response investigations. This paper presents 
the results of a case study identifying data quality 
challenges in a Fortune 500 organization’s incident 
response team. Furthermore, the paper provides the 
foundation for future research regarding data quality 
concerns in security incident response. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Cybersecurity incidents continue to plague 
organizations around the world [1-4]. According to the 
2017 SANS Institute Incident Response Survey [1], 
87% of respondents detected at least one security 
incident in the past year. Similarly, the United Kingdom 
(UK) Government’s 2017 Cyber Security Breaches 
Survey [2] reported that 46% of all UK business 
identified at least one security breach or attack in the 
previous twelve months. These security attacks and 
breaches come at a tremendous financial cost. For 
example, the Ponemon Institute estimates that economic 
losses attributed to security incidents and breaches cost 
United States-based organizations an average of $7.35 
million in 2016 [3]. 
The increasing number of security attacks and data 
breaches fuels regulatory legislation and directives. 
These directives mandate that organizations implement 
mechanisms to protect, recover from and investigate 
attacks that become security incidents. For example, 
Article 32.1(c) within the European Union’s General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) specifies that 
organizations must have “the ability to restore the 
availability and access to personal data in a timely 
manner in the event of a physical or technical      
incident” [5]. Similarly, in the United States, forty-eight 
states and the District of Columbia have enacted 
legislation requiring organizations to notify individuals 
when security breaches involve personally identifiable 
information [6]. 
In an effort to assist organizations with legal and 
regulatory obligations, several institutions, such as the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology     
(NIST) [7], the European Network and Information 
Security Agency (ENISA) [8] and the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) [9] have 
published guidance on security incident investigation 
and recovery techniques. The final phase of many 
security incident response approaches is the ‘feedback’ 
or ‘follow-up’ phase [7, 10, 11]. It is in this phase where 
an organization is expected to learn from a security 
incident with the aim of improving its overall security 
posture [10]. Within incident response, security incident 
learning typically accomplishes this through a series of 
formal reports, meetings and presentations to 
management after the closure of an incident 
investigation [7]. Lessons learned from a security 
investigation can include information about 
enhancements to existing security controls along with 
analyzing the necessity of changes to existing security 
incident response processes and procedures [12]. 
  
For an organization to learn more about the 
underlying causes of a security incident, investigators 
require access to detailed information [13-15]. In fact, 
ENISA contends that one of the critical factors 
influencing the success of an organization’s security 
incident response team is the quality of actionable 
information at the disposal of the team [13]. However, 
researchers have observed that many organizations are 
more focused on eradication and recovery and less on 
security incident learning [16-18]. As a result, there is 
the potential that the quality of data derived from 
security investigations may be unfit for in-depth security 
incident learning. In practice, poor quality data 
produced by a security incident response process can 
also impact other aspects of cybersecurity within an 
organization [19].  
In the past few years, researchers have argued that 
security incident response teams can provide much more 
functionality to an organization than just minimizing the 
damage from a security incident [19-21]. One particular 
function that has emerged is the role of a security 
incident response team within an organization’s security 
threat intelligence program [19-21]. The primary 
objective of such a program is to produce evidence-
based knowledge about risks and threats, which can then 
be used to make informed security decisions within an 
organization [22]. However, for such a security effort to 
be effective, it must be provided with datasets of 
sufficient quality [19]. Providing a threat intelligence 
program with either inaccurate, inconsistent or outdated 
information can produce poor quality intelligence [19].  
From a threat intelligence perspective, security 
response teams provide organizations with an internal 
source of information. The data produced by these teams 
can include information like command and control IP 
addresses, low-level indicators of compromise, and 
malware hash values [13, 20]. Based on the increasing 
number of incidents, the importance of information 
from quality data sources, regulatory activity, and issues 
around eradication and recovery prompts the hypothesis 
that organizations need to enhance the quality of data 
generated during security incident response 
investigations. The proposed hypothesis raises the 
following research questions:  
• What information is produced by a real-world 
security incident response team? 
• Does a security incident response team face 
challenges when attempting to collect and 
document data during a security incident 
response investigation? If so, can these 
challenges be identified? 
The contribution of this paper is a detailed case study 
examining the quality of data generated by a security 
incident response team within a Fortune 500 Financial 
organization. The case study encompasses a document 
analysis involving security investigation records, and 
interviews conducted with the organization’s security 
incident response team. The remainder of this paper is 
structured as follows. Section 2 discusses relevant 
research related to security incident response and 
security threat intelligence. Section 3 describes the 
research methodology and introduces the case study. 
Section 4 describes the case study findings. Section 5 
concludes the work conducted and presents ideas for 
future research. 
 
2. Related Work  
 
A growing number of researchers argue that security 
threat intelligence programs are becoming a 
fundamental component of an organization’s broader 
security agenda [20, 23, 24]. McMillan summarizes 
security threat intelligence as evidence-based 
knowledge about threats, which can be used to make 
informed security decisions within an organization [22]. 
Brewer [25] adds that the objective of security threat 
intelligence is to deliver information, at the right time, 
with the correct and appropriate context, in order to 
reduce the amount of time it takes an organization to 
detect and respond to a security threat.  
Mattern et al. [26] argue that organizations need to 
consider multiple sources of information for its security 
threat intelligence program. These sources can include 
data generated outside of an organization such as 
governmental projects, open source, and publicly-
available databases, as well as commercial          
providers [21]. However, data for a security threat 
intelligence program can also be generated internally 
within an organization [10, 12, 21]. For example, 
network monitors, host-based indicators, and an 
organization’s security incident response team [10, 12, 
21]. The purpose of this team is to minimize the effects 
of an incident and manage an organization’s return to an 
acceptable security posture [14]. However, this team can 
also contribute to an organization’s security threat 
intelligence program by conducting detailed 
investigations, identifying root-causes associated with 
security events and incidents and producing actionable 
information [13]. This actionable information can 
include rogue IP addresses, malware metadata, and 
indicators of compromise [13, 20]. This information can 
also be of interest to regional and national Computer 
Emergency Response Teams [21, 27].  
Regardless of the source, for data to be useful in a 
security threat intelligence program, it must be timely, 
actionable and relevant so that it can assist 
decisionmakers [26]. Previous research has focused on 
the quality of data in various security threat intelligence 
  
platforms [19, 28, 29]. Sillaber et al. [19] conducted a 
study that involved interviewing stakeholders 
responsible for security operations within large 
organizations. The purpose of the study is to investigate 
data quality challenges in threat intelligence sharing 
platforms. One of the findings from their research is that 
manually-entered information is very susceptible to data 
quality issues due to limited data entry checks. Sillaber 
et al. [19] go on to suggest that organizations implement 
automated data quality error checks for both internal and 
external threat intelligence sources. In concert with 
these findings, Al-Ibrahim et al. [29] proposed and 
evaluated various data quality dimensions for security 
threat intelligence platforms. These dimensions 
included correctness, relevance, utility, and uniqueness, 
which were then evaluated through an empirical case 
study using real-world data from antivirus scans [29]. 
Separately, Dandurand and Serrano [28] proposed 
eleven requirements concerning the sharing of threat 
intelligence. However, none of these requirements 
concerned the quality of data.  
In response to a growing security threat, 
organizations are examining different security incident 
response approaches. Typically, these approaches 
consist of six phases [11, 12, 30]: preparation, which 
leads to the detection of an incident, followed by its 
containment which, in turn, allows security incident 
response teams to eradicate, recover and then, 
potentially, provide feedback information into the 
preparation phase.  Although the literature has focused 
on the technical practices for implementing these phases 
within organizations, researchers have also identified 
that many organizations appear to find it difficult to 
apply these approaches [18, 31-33]. The implementation 
difficulty is apparent in various case studies undertaken 
within organizations.  
Hove et al. [31] studied three large organizations 
with the purpose of examining the security incident 
handling plans and procedures within the studied 
organizations. Hove et al. [31] identified that based on 
best practices, many of the organizations were missing 
procedures. For example, in two of the organizations, 
security incident reporting procedures were not 
established while the other organization did not appear 
to have enough staff to respond to incidents       
efficiently [31]. Grispos et al. [34] studied how 
employees within an organization identify and report 
security incidents, based on the process that exists 
within the organization. The results of this study 
indicated that there are opportunities to improve security 
incident recognition and report generation within the 
organization, including education initiatives on ‘what to 
do’ and ‘when to do it’ in regard to incidents [34]. 
Grimes [32] argued that most security incident 
response models have become outdated and no longer 
support organization’s efforts to respond to security 
incidents. Werlinger et al. [33] support these arguments 
and add that security incident handlers often need to 
develop their own tools to perform specific tasks during 
investigations. Tan et al. [18] focused on factors which 
influenced when an organization conducts an actual 
investigation, once a security problem is detected. As 
part of their case study, Tan et al. [18] reported that their 
studied organization had no precise definition for the 
term ‘security incident’ and as a result, incident handlers 
did not realize what security problems were actually 
‘incidents’. Tan et al. [18] found that this problem 
decreased the overall response time to an actual 
incident. While previous research has examined data 
quality challenges in security threat intelligence sharing 
platforms and the challenges of implementing security 
incident response processes within organizations, 
minimal research investigates the quality of data 
generated during a security incident response 
investigation.  
 
3. Research Method  
 
To empirically evaluate the quality of data generated 
during and after security incident response 
investigations, an exploratory case study was 
undertaken within a Fortune 500 Financial   
organization [35]. The benefit of conducting 
exploratory case studies is that they assist researchers to 
understand problems in real-world contexts, along with 
identifying future areas of research [35]. The case study 
was conducted between May and August 2013. The 
name of the organization is being withheld to ensure 
organizational anonymity. Therefore, the names of 
corporate documents and processes have been altered, 
and the results of data collected in the organization are 
presented anonymously. Maintaining organizational 
anonymity helps attain sensitive material, while creating 
an environment that is conducive to the presentation of 
this information. 
The case study utilizes a mixed method approach to 
the collection of data [35]. During the case study, data 
was collected through an analysis of relevant security 
incident response documentation, internal security 
incident response investigation records, and through 
interviews with individuals within the organization. 
This data collection was undertaken in three phases.  
The first phase involved analyzing relevant security 
incident response documentation. The analysis was 
performed to determine how management expects 
security incident response investigations to be 
conducted within the organization, as well as what 
information should be recorded during investigations. 
The primary author was given access to the 
  
organization’s internal documentation repository, which 
was examined to identify and analyze documents related 
to security incident response processes, within the 
organization. These documents are available to all 
individuals within the organization’s Information 
Security Incident Response (ISIR) team. Materials, 
which were considered sensitive, confidential and only 
available to management, were outside the scope of the 
analysis. The documents used in the exploratory case 
study were all signed-off by management before being 
stored in the document repository. The documents were 
analyzed using theme analysis, which allows a 
researcher to examine a variety of topics within a set of 
documents [35, 36]. In this case, the topics examined are 
relevant to security incident response settings. 
The second phase of data collection involved the 
organization’s security incident response database. The 
purpose of this analysis was twofold. First, it was used 
to examine if security investigations are managed and 
handled as per documented processes within the 
organization. Second, the database analysis was used to 
investigate the quality of data stored in the 
organization’s security investigation records. For this 
analysis, the investigation records were examined    
from the perspective of four data quality           
dimensions: accuracy, timeliness, completeness, and           
consistency [37]. For the purpose of this research, 
accuracy is concerned with the difference between the 
correct information required to be documented in the 
investigation record and the information actually 
documented by the incident handlers. Timeliness refers 
to information that is in error because it is outdated and 
differs from the original value. Completeness is 
concerned with ensuring that no information is missing, 
while consistency implies that some form of standard 
exists throughout the information values. These 
dimensions have previously been used to examine the 
quality of data within information systems [37]. All the 
investigation records stored in the database were made 
available by the organization and are included in the 
analysis.  
The third phase of data collection utilized semi-
structured interviews with practitioners in the 
organization. The purpose of the interviews was to 
identify and explore challenges related to conducting 
security incident response investigations in the 
organization, along with examining information 
gathering throughout the overall response process. The 
interview instrument consisted of both open-ended and 
closed questions, which were derived from themes 
identified within industrial white-papers and academic 
research related to security incident response. To 
mitigate researcher bias regarding reliability and 
viability, the interview instrument was validated by two 
information security professionals [35]. Validation was 
only conducted once due to time constraints. The 
interview instrument was approved by the University of 
Glasgow Ethics Committee.   
Initially, interviews were conducted with three 
individuals identified through the organization’s 
security incident response process as the ‘primary 
incident handlers’. A further twelve individuals were 
then identified and interviewed based on answers from 
the initial respondents’ interviews. All fifteen 
individuals have at some point, been involved in the 
investigation and handling of a security incident within 
the organization. All responses to individual questions 
were initially recorded by hand and then digitally 
recorded soon after the interview completion, typically 
within an hour. The results were then examined by hand 
to identify trends, patterns, and anomalies. 
The scope of this research is restricted from the 
following perspectives. This research consists of a 
single case study in a Fortune 500 Financial 
organization based in the United Kingdom. Hence, 
factors potentially impacting the case study include 
local, national and international regulatory 
requirements, along with societal and organizational 
cultural issues. It should also be noted that the primary 
researcher was embedded in the organization for several 
months as-well-as being the primary data collector for 
this investigation.  
 
3.1. Information Security Incident Response 
(ISIR) Team 
 
The organization’s Information Security Incident 
Response (ISIR) team is an ad-hoc team of security 
incident handlers. This team facilitates the identification 
and assignment of actions required to prevent the 
recurrence of issues that are deemed to be or contribute 
to a security incident. The ISIR team follows a 
customized security incident handling approach. The 
approach comprises four phases: 1) incident detection 
and reporting; 2) recording, classification, and 
assignment; 3) investigation and resolution; and 4) 
incident closure. 
The incident detection and reporting phase is 
concerned with the reporting of a security incident to the 
ISIR team. The reporting of an incident can come from 
one of the following sources: a direct request from 
senior management within the organization; a request 
from a member or management of the Information 
Security unit; a request from the Legal Services unit; or 
a request from the Human Resources department within 
the organization. The ISIR team can also be alerted 
about potential incidents by automated methods such as 
intrusion detection systems and data loss prevention 
systems.  
  
During the recording, classification and assignment 
phase, the ISIR team will determine if a security 
incident really exists. If the incident is security-related, 
an investigation record is created in the ISIR team 
database. An incident handler is then appointed, and the 
team agree on the problem statement and the incident 
classification. Depending on the type and impact of the 
security incident, different stakeholders could be 
involved in the subsequent management and 
investigation. For example, if the security incident is 
determined to have a regulatory impact, a governance 
process is invoked together with the organization’s risk 
unit, although the ISIR team still manages the incident.  
The investigation and resolution phase of the process 
identifies the evidence and information that is required 
to conduct a security investigation. At this point, the 
ISIR team holds an incident meeting where the root-
cause is established, and remedy actions associated with 
the incident are assigned to individuals. These 
individuals are expected to fulfill their actions and 
update the incident handler upon their completion.  
The final phase, incident closure, involves two 
stages. First, relevant stakeholders are notified that all 
assigned actions have been completed and the security 
incident record is updated to reflect the closure of the 
incident. The second stage requires that the incident 
handler stores any findings and lessons learned acquired 
from the incident in the ISIR team database. At this 
point, the security incident is considered closed.  
 
3.2. ISIR Team Database 
 
Security investigation records are stored in the 
Information Security Incident Response (ISIR) team 
database, which is hosted on an IBM Lotus Notes server 
within the organization. Within this database, individual 
security investigation records are stored as separate 
documents. Each document includes a copy of the 
security investigation record template, as shown in 
Figure 1 – ISIR Record Template.  
 
 
Figure 1: ISIR Record Template  
The investigation record template consists of 
twenty-two (22) fields, divided into three parts (labeled 
as Parts A through C in Figure 1). These labels have 
been added to the record template to aid with the 
discussion below. Part A of the template prompts 
incident handlers to record information concerning the 
reported date and time of the security incident. The third 
field in this section called ‘Duration’, is used to 
document how long a particular security investigation 
took to complete within the organization.  
Part B of the template concerns contact details about 
the individual who is managing and handling the 
investigation within the ISIR team. Recorded 
information includes the incident handler’s name and 
job title; the name of their department and its physical 
location; their telephone and mobile phone numbers; 
email address and fax number.  
Part C provides fields where incident handlers are 
expected to document information about the 
investigation itself. Although no confirmation is 
provided in the record template or within the ISIR 
process, the ‘Date’ and ‘Time’ fields within this section 
appear to be used to document the initial start date and 
time of the investigation. The purpose of the ‘Incident 
Type’ and ‘Incident Location’ fields is to document the 
type of investigation and its location in the organization. 
The ‘Initial Impact assessment’ and ‘Incident Cause’ 
fields are used to document any initial assessment of 
how the incident has affected the organization and what 
caused the incident to occur. However, the ISIR process 
does not elaborate on what information should be 
documented in these fields. The ‘Investigation Record’ 
field provides a space for the ISIR team to document and 
record investigation proceedings as and when they 
occur.  
At the conclusion of an investigation, the incident 
handlers can complete the remaining fields at the bottom 
of Part C. The ‘Cost of Incident’ field can be used to 
record the resources expended on an investigation, 
while the ‘Conclusion’ field provides a space for the 
incident handler to document concluding remarks from 
the investigation. The final two fields ‘Post Incident 
Lessons Learned’ and ‘Preventive Actions to be Taken’ 
are used to document and record any lessons learned 
identified from the investigation, as well as any actions, 
which need to be taken post-incident. 
 
4. Data Collection and Analysis 
 
Fifteen (15) semi-structured interviews were 
conducted within the organization during the 
exploratory case study. The interview sample consisted 
of individuals in a variety of information security roles 
including, information security managers, senior 
  
security analysts, and security analysts. The individuals 
also indicated that they had a diverse range of work 
experience within a technical role. The interviewees 
have a minimum of two (2) years and a maximum of 
thirty-nine (39) years experience. The mean average 
experience of the interviewees was thirteen and a half 
(13.5) years. 
The analysis of the ISIR team database revealed that 
one hundred and eighty-eight (188) security 
investigations were recorded in the database, at the time 
of the case study. The analysis of the investigation 
records, coupled with the findings from the interviews, 
are presented from the perspectives of data accuracy 
within the records and the timeliness of information 
available to the ISIR team. The records are also 
examined from the standpoint of documented 
information consistency and completeness.  
 
4.1. Accuracy of Data 
 
Regarding data accuracy, several observations 
appeared during the investigation records analysis. The 
first observation is related to the accuracy of date 
information within the investigation record itself. The 
‘Date’ field is initially available in Section A of the 
record template, where the assumption is that the field 
describes the reported date of a security incident to the 
ISIR team. However, a ‘Date’ field is also present in 
Section C of the record template, with no further 
guidance on the purpose of this ‘Date’ information field. 
There are several potential uses of this field including 
the opening date for the investigation record, the 
incident identification or discovery date, or the 
implementation date of the first mitigation actions. As a 
result of this ambiguity, there is the potential that the 
information recorded in this ‘Date’ field is inaccurate. 
The information documented in the field might not 
represent the correct value that management expects 
within the investigation record template. The problem is 
inflated further due to a lack of document process 
specificity regarding what date information should be 
documented into the template. 
A second observation related to the accuracy of data 
is related to the ‘Incident Type’ field. The analysis of 
the records revealed that the word ‘incident’ is prevalent 
in the majority of the investigation records. This 
strongly suggests that these records are considered by 
the ISIR team to be ‘security incidents’. However, when 
queried about this phenomenon during the interviews, 
the participants indicated that a large number of the 
records classified as ‘security incidents’ were not all 
‘incidents’ but a combination of ‘security incidents’ and 
‘security events’. It was interesting to observe that at the 
time of the case study, no formal security incident 
response categorization taxonomy existed within the 
organization. Hence, there is the potential that the 
number and type of incidents recorded as occurring 
within the organization is imprecise information.  
The results, of querying the interview participants as 
to the meaning of the term ‘security incident’, supports 
the idea that the classification of security incidents is 
imprecise. A wide variety of answers were received, 
which included: “breach of security policy”; 
“degradation or circumvention of security controls”; 
“data loss”; “financial losses” and “threat to service 
availability”. The variety of answers received from this 
query indicates that the organization does not have a 
unified definition of the term ‘security incident’. The 
consequence is that the ISIR team could find it difficult 
to identify, generate and document accurate incident 
category titles for security investigations occurring 
within the organization.  
A third observation concerning the accuracy of 
information in the investigation record regards the 
documentation of contact information. According to the 
investigation record template, the ISIR team is expected 
to use the fields within Section B of the template to 
record contact information regarding the incident 
handler assigned to the investigation. However, the 
analysis of this information revealed that the contact 
information for nearly half the records did not belong to 
individuals handling the incident, but the individuals 
who are reporting the incident to the ISIR team. It is 
imperative to note that the documented process does not 
specify what information should be recorded in the 
template. However, this ambiguity has resulted in the 
storage of inaccurate information in Section B of the 
investigation record template. Documentation clarity 
regarding the type of information to record in this 
section would help the ISIR team to quickly identify 
whom to contact for further details regarding specific 
investigations. Hence, more precious and accurate 
information could be recorded in the investigation 
record.  
 
4.2. Timeliness of Data 
 
Time is a critical factor in many security incident 
investigations [11, 16]. In some incidents, it could 
become vital for security incident handlers to quickly 
obtain access to data before it is overwritten or becomes 
outdated. However, during the interviews, ten (10) out 
of the fifteen (15) respondents suggested that the ISIR 
team often encounters challenges related to the 
timeliness of security data. As a result, some of this data 
could be outdated, or it may differ from the original 
value. A variety of challenges were described 
preventing access to timely data including obstacles to 
obtaining physical access to data, short data retention 
  
times, and limited support from third-parties involved in 
the incident investigation.  
West-Brown et al. [38] argue that metrics provide an 
accurate way of quantifying the performance of security 
incident response teams. West-Brown et al. [38] defined 
response time as the period from the first report of a 
security incident to the implementation of the first 
mitigating actions. They describe the total time to 
resolve an incident as the time from when the security 
incident is reported to the time the incident is closed. It 
is interesting that West-Brown et al. [38] note that 
although such information is useful to analyze the 
historical performance of a security incident response 
team, there are no published recommended times to 
evaluate such groups. However, the information 
recorded in the investigation records can be useful to 
determine and identify potential challenges to obtaining 
timely information during security incident 
investigations.  
Fifty-two (52) incident records contained data 
concerning the response time. The minimum response 
time calculated from these records was two minutes and 
the maximum response time was 325 minutes. The 
average response time was 56.30 minutes. Figure 2 – 
Cumulative Response Times presents the percentage of 
incidents which were responded to over a given period 
of time. As shown in Figure 2, the ISIR team takes 
mitigating actions within thirty minutes for 
approximately sixty percent (60%) of the recorded 
security incidents and within two hours for ninety 
percent (90%) of the incidents. 
 
 
Figure 2: Cumulative Response Times 
Sixty-two (62) of the incident records contain data 
concerning the total time to resolution; meaning that 
there were one-hundred and twenty-six (126) incidents 
that did not include enough information for this 
calculation. Out of the sixty-two (62), the minimum 
time to resolve an incident was half a day and the 
maximum time to address an incident was one-hundred 
and thirty (130) days. Therefore, the average time to 
address an incident was just under 12 days. Figure 3 – 
Cumulative Total Time to Resolve Incidents presents 
the percentage of incidents that were resolved from the 
first reporting to closure over a given period. 
The ISIR team resolves twenty percent (20%) of the 
analyzed incidents in half a day, and eighty percent 
(80%) of the analyzed incidents are resolved within 
twenty days (20). In summary, the response and total 
time to resolve calculations support the idea that some 
of the investigation data being collected by the ISIR 
team could be either outdated or unavailable because of 
challenges preventing access to timely data. 
 
Figure 3: Cumulative Total Time to Resolve 
Incidents  
4.3. Completeness of Data 
 
The completeness analysis focuses on the number of 
fields within the investigation record that are completed 
during the documentation of a security investigation. At 
a high-level, this analysis shows that only one field, the 
‘Investigation Record’ field, was considered complete 
in the one hundred and eighty-eight (188) investigation 
records. For this analysis, a field is considered complete 
if data is visible in the field, regardless of its accuracy 
dimension.  
A further seven (7) out of the twenty-two (22) fields 
were completed in at least ninety-four percent (94%) of 
the investigation records. In contrast, the ‘Duration’ and 
‘Cost of Incident’ fields were only completed in thirteen 
percent (13%) of the investigation records. Moreover, 
fifty (50) investigation records (27%) contained 
information within the ‘Post-Incident Lessons Learned’ 
field, and only twenty-eight (28) records or fifteen 
percent (15%) provide information within the 
‘Preventive Actions’ field. Hence, nearly three-quarters 
of the investigation records did not contain lessons 
learned regarding the security investigation. Table 1 – 
Number of Completed Fields summarizes the number 
and percentage of completed fields within the ISIR team 
database.  
From an overall investigation record perspective, 
only one (1) out of the one hundred and eighty-eight 
(188) records analyzed during the study were considered 
completed, from the perspective of all twenty-two (22) 
  
fields. This means that one hundred and eighty-seven 
(187) records contained one or more fields that were 
incomplete, regarding information in the documented 
security investigation. Fifteen (15) investigation records 
were found to be missing between one and three fields; 
forty-one (41) records were found to be missing four to 
six fields, while one hundred and seventeen (117) 
records were missing seven to ten fields of information. 
Furthermore, fourteen (14) records were missing 
information within eleven (11) or more fields in the 
investigation record template. This finding suggests that 
the incident handlers are not completing the entire 
incident record during incident investigations within the 
organization. 
 
Field Name 
No. of 
Records (% 
of Overall) 
Date 181 (96%) 
Time 176 (94%) 
Duration   24 (13%) 
Name 186 (99%) 
Job Title 185 (98%) 
Department 184 (98%) 
Location 180 (96%) 
Telephone 180 (96%) 
Mobile   62 (33%) 
Email 164 (87%) 
Fax   39 (21%) 
Date 178 (95%) 
Time 167 (89%) 
Incident Type 145 (77%) 
Incident Location   97 (52%) 
Initial Impact Assessment    68 (36%) 
Incident Cause 155 (82%) 
Investigation Record 188 (100%) 
Cost of Incident   25 (13%) 
Conclusion   54 (29%) 
Post-Incident Lessons Learned   50 (27%) 
Preventative Actions to Be Taken   28 (15%) 
Table 1: Number of Completed Fields 
To explore why incomplete information was 
recorded in the investigation records, the interview 
participants were queried to determine if and when data 
is collected regarding a security investigation. The 
majority of the answers returned were positive. Fourteen 
(14) out of the fifteen (15) respondents suggested that 
data is collected and stored throughout the 
organization’s security incident response lifecycle. 
However, one individual indicated that he/she did not 
know if the practice took place. The respondents did 
indicate that investigation information was assigned and 
performed by an incident handler that has been 
designated as the primary incident handler and it was the 
responsibility of this individual to ensure that 
information was documented. 
When the individuals were asked about what 
information is documented within the records, this 
information included investigation meeting notes, 
actions to be taken for remediation, copies of any logs 
and emails associated with the investigation, as well as 
communication between the ISIR team and 
management. However, information related to the 
individual fields within the investigation record 
template were not mentioned by the respondents. This 
suggests that the organization does not have a uniform 
approach to capturing specific information and that the 
information captured focuses on assisting with the 
eradication and recovery aspect of the lifecycle. 
However, this approach potentially hinders capturing 
actionable information that could facilitate meaningful 
threat intelligence for future use.  
 
4.4. Consistency of Data 
 
Regarding consistency, the analysis focused on the 
information recorded within the individual fields in the 
investigation record template. Several observations 
were evident in this analysis. The first observation was 
related to the representation of date and time 
information within the investigation records. In both 
cases, the document analysis revealed that incident 
handlers are not provided guidance on a standard format 
to document these two metrics. As a result, dates and 
times are stored in different formats. For example, date 
information was found to be in the following formats: 
DD/MM/YY, DD/MM/YYYY, DD/MM, and MM/DD. 
Similar observations were noticed with time 
information, which was documented in both 12-hour 
and 24-hour formats. Moreover, in some cases, it was 
difficult to distinguish what time format was actually 
being used by the incident handler.  
The second observation regarding consistency is 
related to the ‘Incident Type’ field, and the inconsistent 
information used to describe an incident. For example, 
an investigation where potential data loss has been an 
issue, the following information was found to be 
recorded in the ‘Incident Type’ field’: ‘potential data 
exposure’, ‘potential data leakage’, ‘potential security 
breach’, ‘exposure of live data’, ‘email to the wrong 
person’, and ‘loss of data’. This finding reiterates the 
lack of a consistent security incident response 
categorization taxonomy within the organization. 
However, it also revealed that two investigation records 
of the same type, can potentially, be described with 
different incident type descriptions. This could 
complicate the identification of indicators of 
compromise later in the intelligence process.  
  
One potential explanation regarding the 
inconsistency of data recorded in the investigation 
record could be the limited resources available to the 
ISIR team. While twelve (12) out of the fifteen (15) 
individuals confirmed that the organization uses a 
document-centric security incident response approach, 
five (5) people suggested that the process is not always 
followed. When questioned as to the reasons for process 
deviation, answers comprised of time constraints, a lack 
of staff to run the entire process, and a lack of support 
for handling specific security investigations. Hence, the 
findings suggest that there is a potential link between the 
quality of consistent information documented in the 
incident investigation record and the resources available 
to the ISIR team.   
 
5. Conclusions and Future Work 
 
Security incidents are increasingly impacting 
industries in today’s globally networked environments. 
As a result, organizations are exploring alternative 
security measures, such as security threat intelligence 
programs. However, for such a program to be a success, 
organizations need to ensure that all viable data is 
collected, validated, and recorded into relevant 
datastores, to support an overall security threat 
intelligence effort. Security incident response 
investigations are no exception to these requirements. 
Any data collected during the course of an investigation 
that is translated into actionable information will have a 
direct impact on the viability of derived intelligence. 
Empirical analysis of the security incident response 
landscape in a Fortune 500 Financial organization 
revealed that the quality of data generated during the 
security incident response lifecycle needs to be 
addressed. The results from the case study suggest that 
the data currently generated from the organization’s 
security incident response process does not appear to 
help facilitate security threat intelligence, either during 
or after the closure of an investigation. A message that 
emerges from this research is that other organizations, 
similar to the organization in this exploratory case study, 
need to examine the quality of data generated during and 
after their security incident investigations. It is plausible 
that other organizations could also have data quality 
issues in their security incident response lifecycle. 
Several opportunities exist for future research. One 
area of future research will identify, investigate and 
evaluate methods, tools, and techniques that can be used 
to enhance the quality of data generated during and after 
security investigations. One potential avenue could 
involve the integration of disciplined agile principles 
and practices into the security incident response process 
as a viable method of strengthening an organization’s 
security incident response data quality proficiencies. 
Another potential area of research is to explore 
automated approaches for reducing data quality issues 
during a security incident response investigation. 
Additional areas of research also include investigating 
the optimal data capture automation and the overall 
impact of this automation throughout all the phases of a 
security incident investigation. This research would 
include the examination of methods and tools to 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of data 
generation and collection within security incident 
response teams. Future research will repeat and expand 
the existing case study in similar and other organizations 
and industry sectors. The objective of the expansion is 
to determine the generalizability and transferability of 
the data quality issues identified in this case study with 
respect to other industries. 
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